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Abstract
Quantization becomes a new way to study classical game theory since quan-
tum strategies and quantum games have been proposed. In previous studies,
many typical game models, such as prisoner’s dilemma, battle of the sexes,
Hawk-Dove game, have been investigated by using quantization approaches.
In this paper, several game models of opinion formations have been quan-
tized based on the Marinatto-Weber quantum game scheme, a frequently
used scheme to convert classical games to quantum versions. Our results
show that the quantization can change fascinatingly the properties of some
classical opinion formation game models so as to generate win-win outcomes.
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1. Introduction
In realistic life, there are large amount of opinion interactions on many is-
sues of interest among social individuals. Opinion formation and evolutionary
dynamics have become very interesting and meaningful research fields [1–3].
Many models, such as DeGroot model [4], Sznajd model [5], discrete CODA
model [6], Hegselmann-Krause model [7], generalized Glauber models [8],
Deffuant model [9], have been developed to simulate interaction mechanisms
of opinions. In recent years, game theory, which provides a useful framework
to build foundational models to mimick the interactions among agents with
conflict of interests in many disciplines [10–19], has also been used in these
fields to help understand opinion formation and evolution. With respect to
opinion formation, a lot of game models have been proposed or used in pre-
vious studies [20–25]. Among these, several models given by Di Mare and
Latora [20] has attracted much interest due to the simplicity and affluent
meanings of those models.
Quantum game is a new breakthrough of game theory, inspired by quan-
tum information theory. It extends the classical strategy space to a quantum
strategy space, and rules players playing the game by following quantum
rules. At present, there are several typical quantum game schemes, for ex-
ample Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein scheme [26] and Marinatto-Weber scheme
[27], to quantize the classical strategy space so as to build quantum games.
Quantization approaches have already been adopted to many classical game
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models, for example prisoner’s dilemma [26, 28], battle of the sexes [27],
Hawk-Dove game [29, 30], and so on [31–38]. Through quantization, these
game models show some different characteristics, compared with their classi-
cal counterparts. However, the game models of opinion formation are not yet
studied by using quantization approaches. It is very interesting to see what
happens and whether new features emerge if quantizing the classical opinion
formation game models. Motivated by this idea, the quantization of opinion
formation games are studied in this paper. During this study, we follow and
use Di Mare and Latora’s models to simulate the interactions between two
individuals with different opinions, and Marinatto-Weber scheme to quantiz-
ing the classical game models. The results show that the quantization can
change fascinatingly the properties of some classical opinion formation game
models so as to generate win-win outcomes.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Game models of opinion formation
In Di Mare and Latora’s game models of opinion formation [20], two
players, row player A and column player B, paly one-shot games with three
strategies, namely to keep one’s own opinion (Keep), to change one’s own
opinion (Change), and to take a compromise opinion (Agree). When players
take different actions, they receive different payoffs:
• s = +a if the other player changes her opinion
• s = +b if the player keeps her opinion
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• s = −b if the other player keeps her opinion
• s = −a if the player changes her opinion
• s = +c or s = +c + 1/d if the other player changes her opinion with
an intermediate one
• s = −c or s = −c + 1/d if the player changes her opinion with an
intermediate one
where a, b, c, d > 0. Based on these payoffs mentioned above, three different
payoff matrices are derived.
Game model (GM) I:
Chang Keep
Chang
Keep

 (0, 0) (−a− b,+a+ b)
(+a + b,−a− b) (0, 0)

 (1)
GM II:
Chang Keep Agree
Chang
Keep
Agree


(0, 0) (−a− b,+a + b) (−a + c,+a− c)
(+a+ b,−a− b) (0, 0) (+b+ c,−b− c)
(+a− c,−a+ c) (−b− c,+b+ c) (0, 0)


(2)
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GM III:
Chang Keep Agree
Chang
Keep
Agree


(0, 0) (−a− b,+a + b) (−a + c+ 1
d
,+a− c+ 1
d
)
(+a+ b,−a− b) (0, 0) (+b+ c+ 1
d
,−b− c + 1
d
)
(+a− c+ 1
d
,−a + c+ 1
d
) (−b− c+ 1
d
,+b+ c+ 1
d
) (2
d
, 2
d
)


(3)
GM I, which does not consider the strategy “Agree”, is a zero-sum game,
and it has a single Nash equilibrium (NE) (Keep,Keep). GM II is also a zero-
sum game whose unique NE is (Keep,Keep) as well. GM III contains some
differences: Firstly, GM III is not a zero-sum game; Secondly, different from
GM I and GM II, in GM III the distance between two players’ opinions,
denoted as d, has been taken into consideration based on such idea that
two individuals are much easier to reach an agreement if their opinions are
closer; Third, GM III has two different NE points corresponding to different
conditions, one is (Keep,Keep) where the joint payoff of two players is 0 if
d ≥ 1/(b + c), the other is (Agree, Agree) where the joint payoff is 4/d if
d ≤ 1/(b+ c).
It is easy to prove that the point (Agree, Agree) is the Pareto optimality
of GM III. At that point, the outcome of the game between these two players
with different opinions is not a zero-sum, but a win-win. However, in GM
III it is conditional to realize the Pareto optimality. If d > 1/(b+ c), GM III
still generates zero-sum outcomes, as same as GM I and GM II.
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2.2. MW scheme for strategic game
Marinatto-Weber (MW) scheme [27] is one of the most frequently used
quantum game schemes, which is developed for quantizing matrix games
with 2× 2 dimension. Here, we use the battle of the sexes as an example to
introduce the MW scheme.
In the game of battle of the sexes, players are Alice and Bob, each
of them has two choices, opera (O) and football (F ). The payoffs are
different for various strategy combinations of Alice and Bob, for example
EA(O,F ) represents Alice’s payoff when she chooses strategy O and Bob
chooses strategy F . Then, a four-dimensional Hilbert space H can be de-
fined for the battle of the sexes by giving its orthonormal basis vectors
H = HA ⊗ HB = {|OO〉 , |OF 〉 , |FO〉 , |FF 〉}, where the first qubit is re-
served to the state of Alice and the second one to that of Bob.
In the initial, assuming that Alice and Bob share the following quantum
state:
|ψin〉 = u11 |OO〉+ u12 |OF 〉+ u21 |FO〉+ u22 |FF 〉 (4)
where |u11|2+ |u12|2+ |u21|2+ |u22|2 = 1. According to state vector |ψin〉, the
associated density matrix can be derived as ρin = |ψin〉 〈ψin|.
Let C be a unitary and Hermitian operator (i.e., C† = C = C−1) such
that C |O〉 = |F 〉, C |F 〉 = |O〉, and I be the identity operator. In the game
process, Alice and Bob use operators I and C with probabilities p, (1 − p),
q, (1 − q), respectively. Then, the final density matrix for this two-qubit
6
quantum system takes the form:
ρfin = pq
[
(IA ⊗ IB)ρin(I†A ⊗ I†B)
]
+p(1− q)
[
(IA ⊗ CB)ρin(I†A ⊗ C†B)
]
+(1− p)q
[
(CA ⊗ IB)ρin(C†A ⊗ I†B)
]
+(1− p)(1− q)
[
(CA ⊗ CB)ρin(C†A ⊗ C†B)
]
(5)
In order to calculate the payoffs, two payoff operators are introduced:
PA = EA(O,O) |OO〉 〈OO|+ EA(O,F ) |OF 〉 〈OF |
+EA(F,O) |FO〉 〈FO|+ EA(F, F ) |FF 〉 〈FF |
(6)
PB = EB(O,O) |OO〉 〈OO|+ EB(O,F ) |OF 〉 〈OF |
+EB(F,O) |FO〉 〈FO|+ EB(F, F ) |FF 〉 〈FF |
(7)
Finally, the payoff functions of Alice and Bob can be obtained as mean
values of these operators:
$¯A(p, q) = Tr(PAρfin), $¯B(p, q) = Tr(PBρfin). (8)
As stated above, (4) - (8) clearly show how the MW scheme quantizes a
classical game. It is worthy noting that the original MW scheme is just able
to deal with 2× 2 matrix games. Several works [39–41] are devoted to study
the generalization of classical MW scheme, which strengthens the ability of
this quantum scheme.
3. Quantizing opinion formation games via the MW scheme
In this paper, we follow the MW scheme to quantize the classical game
models of opinion formation, GM I, GM II, and GM III. In terms of these
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quantum game models, we investigate the impact of quantization on the
classical opinion formation games. Especially, whether the joint payoff of
two players is increased or not by the quantization. In these quantum game
models, strategy “Change”, “Keep” and “Agree” are simply denoted as 1, 2,
and 3, respectively.
3.1. Quantum GM I
Let us first quantize the GM I whose payoff matrix is shown as (1).
Without loss of generality, initially assuming that two individuals, A and B
share the following entangled state:
|ψin〉 = u11 |11〉+ u12 |12〉+ u21 |21〉+ u22 |22〉 (9)
where |u11|2 + |u12|2 + |u21|2 + |u22|2 = 1., and the first qubit is reserved for
strategy of row player A and the second for column player B.
Let C be a unitary (i.e., C† = C = C−1) such that C |1〉 = |2〉, C |2〉 =
|1〉. Player A performs identity operator I with probability p, and C with
probability 1−p. Analogously, player B uses I with probability q and C with
probability 1− q. Then, the final density matrix for this two-qubit quantum
system, ρfin, can be obtained according to (5). Finally, according to (6) - (8),
the expected payoff functions for player A and B can be derived as follow:
$¯A(p, q) = −(a + b)(p|u11|2 + p|u12|2 − p|u21|2 − p|u22|2
−q|u11|2 + q|u12|2 − q|u21|2 + q|u22|2 − |u12|2 + |u21|2)
$¯B(p, q) = (a + b)(p|u11|2 + p|u12|2 − p|u21|2 − p|u22|2
−q|u11|2 + q|u12|2 − q|u21|2 + q|u22|2 − |u12|2 + |u21|2)
(10)
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It is found that $¯A(p, q) + $¯B(p, q) = 0, which means that the quantization
does not change the zero-sum essence of GM I. For the quantum GM I, a NE
(p∗, q∗) can be found by imposing the following two conditions:
$¯A(p
∗, q∗)− $¯A(p, q∗) = (a+ b)(p− p∗)(|u11|2 + |u12|2 − |u21|2 − |u22|2) ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ [0, 1]
$¯B(p
∗, q∗)− $¯B(p∗, q) = (a+ b)(q − q∗)(|u11|2 − |u12|2 + |u21|2 − |u22|2) ≥ 0, ∀q ∈ [0, 1]
(11)
From inequalities (11), it is easy to prove that the quantum GM I can be
reduced to the classical GM I if there does exist a term which is equal to 1
among |u11|2, |u12|2, |u21|2, |u22|2. Again, due to $¯A(p, q) + $¯B(p, q) = 0, the
quantum GM I is still a zero-sum game, unconditionally. Additionally, there
may exist other properties, but they are ignored in this paper since we pay
main attention on the trait of joint payoff.
3.2. Quantum GM II
Now, let us consider GM II whose payoff matrix is shown as (2). It is
noticed that GM II is a 3 × 3 game and the original MW quantum scheme
is only suitable for 2 × 2 games. In [39, 40], Iqbal and Toor extended the
classical MW scheme to bi-matrix games with 3×3 dimension. In this paper,
we follow the generalized MW scheme proposed by Iqbal and Toor to build
quantum GM II. Similaryly, without loss of generality, the initial state shared
by two players, A and B, are assumed as follows.
|ψin〉 =
∑
i,j=1,2,3
uij |ij〉 ,
∑
i,j=1,2,3
|uij|2 = 1. (12)
In the quantum GM II, each player possesses three unitary operators, I,
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C and D, such that
I |1〉 = |1〉 , C |1〉 = |3〉 , D |1〉 = |2〉 ,
I |2〉 = |2〉 , C |2〉 = |2〉 , D |2〉 = |1〉 ,
I |3〉 = |3〉 , C |3〉 = |1〉 , D |3〉 = |3〉 .
(13)
where C† = C = C−1, D† = D = D−1, and I is the identity operator. Sup-
pose player A uses C, D, I with probabilities p, p1, (1 − p− p1). Similarly,
player B performs C, D and I with probabilities q, q1 and (1−q−q1), respec-
tively. The final density matrix after A and B have played their strategies
can be obtained as below.
ρfin = (1− p− p1)(1− q − q1)
[
(IA ⊗ IB)ρin(I†A ⊗ I†B)
]
+p(1− q − q1)
[
(CA ⊗ IB)ρin(C†A ⊗ I†B)
]
+ p1(1− q − q1)
[
(DA ⊗ IB)ρin(D†A ⊗ I†B)
]
+(1− p− p1)q
[
(IA ⊗ CB)ρin(I†A ⊗ C†B)
]
+ (1− p− p1)q1
[
(IA ⊗DB)ρin(I†A ⊗D†B)
]
+pq
[
(CA ⊗ CB)ρin(C†A ⊗ C†B)
]
+ pq1
[
(CA ⊗DB)ρin(C†A ⊗D†B)
]
+p1q
[
(DA ⊗ CB)ρin(D†A ⊗ C†B)
]
+ p1q1
[
(DA ⊗DB)ρin(D†A ⊗D†B)
]
(14)
where ρin = |ψin〉 〈ψin|. In this situation, assuming that EX(i, j) represents
the payoff of player X when X’s strategy is i and the other’s strategy is j,
the payoff operators for A and B are
PA =
∑
i,j=1,2,3
EA(i, j) |ij〉 〈ji| , PB =
∑
i,j=1,2,3
EB(i, j) |ij〉 〈ji|. (15)
Finally, the payoffs of A and B can be obtained as follows:
$¯A(p, p1, q, q1) = Tr(PAρfin), $¯B(p, p1, q, q1) = Tr(PBρfin). (16)
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By means of the generalized MW scheme described above, the GM II can
be quantized. Various NEs can be found by changing the initial state |ψin〉.
The expected payoff functions of A and B are denoted as $¯A(p, p1, q, q1)
and $¯B(p, p1, q, q1), respectively. Since the expressions are very long, here
we do not give. As same as the quantum GM I, a result is found that
$¯A(p, p1, q, q1)+ $¯B(p, p1, q, q1) = 0, which implies that the quantum GM II is
still a zero-sum game. In summary, although the quantization can produce
more NEs, the outcomes of quantum GM I and quantum GM II are still
zero-sum.
3.3. Quantum GM III
Now, let us investigate the GM III whose payoff matrix is given as (3). By
using the generalized MW scheme as shown in (12) - (16), the expected payoff
functions $¯A(p, p1, q, q1) and $¯B(p, p1, q, q1) can be derived. Here, our atten-
tion has mainly been paid on the joint payoff of $¯A(p, p1, q, q1)+$¯B(p, p1, q, q1),
which is given as below:
$¯A(p, p1, q, q1) + $¯B(p, p1, q, q1) = (2 |u13|2 + 2 |u23|2 + 2 |u31|2 + 2 |u32|2 + 4 |u33|2
+2p |u11|2 + 2p |u12|2 + 2p |u13|2 − 2p |u31|2 − 2p |u32|2 − 2p |u33|2
+2q |u11|2 − 2q |u13|2 + 2q |u21|2 − 2q |u23|2 + 2q |u31|2 − 2q |u33|2)/d
(17)
Equation (17) is relevant with p, q, uij, i, j = 1, 2, 3, whose maximum
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value can be found by the following optimization problem.
max $¯A(p, p1, q, q1) + $¯B(p, p1, q, q1)
s.t.


∑
i,j=1,2,3
|uij|2 = 1
p, q ∈ [0, 1]
(18)
It is easy to find that the maximum value of $¯A(p, p1, q, q1)+$¯B(p, p1, q, q1)
is 4/d where |ui∗j∗|2 = 1, ∀i 6= i∗ and j 6= j∗, |uij|2 = 0. Recalling the
approach of MW scheme, we know that |ψin〉 = |ij〉 means the quantum
game degrades into a classical game. The result implies two points: (i) The
quantum version of GM III can not produce better result – bigger joint payoff
– compared with the classical version; (ii) In a NE of quantum GM III, the
outcomes may be not zero-sum. Let us review NEs in the classical GM III:
a NE with joint payoff 0 when d ≥ 1/(b + c), and a NE with joint payoff
4/d when d ≤ 1/(b + c). So, in the classical GM III, it is conditional to
reach a non-zero-sum NE. If d > 1/(b+ c), the GM III still produce zero-sum
outcomes.
However, the situation is different in quantum game of GM III. It is pos-
sible to find a NE which realizes a non-zero-sum equilibrium but without the
condition d ≤ 1/(b+ c). For example, assuming |u11|2 = |u33|2 = 0.5, namely
the initial state is |ψin〉 =
√
0.5 |11〉 + √0.5 |33〉. Based on the generalized
MW quantum scheme, the expected payoffs of two players can be obtained:
$¯A(p, p1, q, q1) = (adp1 − adq1 + bdp1 − bdq1 + 2)/2d
$¯B(p, p1, q, q1) = (adq1 − adp1 − bdp1 + bdq1 + 2)/2d
(19)
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A NE (p∗, p∗1, q
∗, q∗1) can be found by imposing the following conditions:
$¯A(p
∗, p∗1, q
∗, q∗1)− $¯A(p, p1, q∗, q∗1) = (p∗1 − p1)(a+ b)/2 ≥ 0, ∀p1 ∈ [0, 1]
$¯B(p
∗, p∗1, q
∗, q∗1)− $¯B(p∗, p∗1, q, q1) = (q∗1 − q1)(a + b)/2 ≥ 0, ∀q1 ∈ [0, 1]
(20)
Obviously, inequations (20) are satisfied if p∗1 = q
∗
1 = 1. Therefore, a set of
NEs, {(p∗, p∗1, q∗, q∗1) | p∗, q∗ ∈ [0, 1], p∗1 = 1, q∗1 = 1}, is found. At these equi-
librium points, the joint payoff of A and B is 2/d, and $¯A(p
∗, p∗1, q
∗, q∗1) = 1/d
and $¯B(p, p1, q, q1) = 1/d. More importantly, these NEs do exist uncondition-
ally, given such an initial state. So, the results show that the quantization
to GM III produces win-win outcomes without the need of any specific con-
ditions. Here, the quantization changes fascinatingly the properties of GM
III, which brings new insight on the opinion formation.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, the quantization is first used in opinion formation games
based on the MW quantum scheme. We have investigated three basic game
models of opinion formation. Some interesting results have been revealed.
For these opinion formation game models which are zero-sum, the quan-
tum versions of these games preserve the zero-sum nature. However, for the
game model which would conditionally produce non-zero-sum outcomes, for
example the model considering the distance between two individuals with
different opinions, the quantization generates win-win outcomes with remov-
ing the original condition required. This work brings new insight to opinion
formation and evolution. In the future research, we will further study more
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realistic opinion game models, such as “Stubborn individuals and Orators”
(SO) model [20] which has considered the diversity of characters and behav-
iors of individuals, by using quantization approaches.
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